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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Synopsis of Issue
"[N]o person, not even the most learned judge much less a layman,
is capable of knowing in advance of an ultimate decision in his particu-
lar case by this Court whether certain material comes within the area
.... "' The last words of this famous quotation are not "of software pat-
ents"; they are "of obscenity." Justice Brennan adopted these words
from Justice Black's vigorous condemnation of the regulation of ob-
scenity. In doing so, Justice Brennan turned away from the "without
socially redeeming value" standard of obscenity that he had created in
earlier opinions.
While these words were written before software patents were a sig-
nificant reality, the language seems like the most reasoned explanation
of the swirl of conflicting case law surrounding the patentability of
software, the recent issuance of proposed regulations of software patents
by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the "sure" view that
algorithms should not be patentable.
If a court does not desire an invention to be patentable, the court
need only reach for the shibboleth of abstract formula, scientific truth,
or natural law,3 and, presto, it is not patentable. If patentability is de-
sired, the court need only seize the shibboleth of structure or physical
* Brooke Schunmm II is licensed as a patent attorney and is a principal of the firm of
Daneker, McIntire & Davis, P.C. in Baltimore, MD. He graduated with a degree in Opera-
tions Research/Industrial Engineering from Cornell University and with a J.D. from the
University of Michigan Law School.
1. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 87 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 78-80 (criticizing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
3. Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939), cited in Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972), Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981), and Arrhythmia
Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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aspect, and, however thin the connection, the inventor has a patent. As
one author put it, "The ... test seems to boil down to the unhelpful 'I
know an abstract idea when I see it.' ,4 Such convolutions bring to mind
Justice Brennan's later comment in the Paris Adult Theatre f case that
"6one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five
members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have
pronounced it so."' He was, of course, speaking of the Supreme Court
and obscenity, not of the Federal Circuit and software patents.
Of particular concern in this article is the patent contract that the
People of the United States ordained in the Constitution. The People
provided for their benefit that in return for a disclosure of a useful in-
vention, the People would grant the inventor a monopoly to exclude
others from practicing the invention. One of the difficulties with the
current state of the law is that the copyright law effectively grants a mo-
nopoly to a software owner without the public obtaining any disclosure.
Due to mask work protection,8 or simply because a string of bits-the
ones and zeroes of which software is made-is not readable, the public
has no disclosure for inventions to be built upon. The mask work re-
mains a trade secret, using that term in a layperson's sense, while an
effective monopoly in favor of the author is created. Much of the case
law and controversy is an explicit and implicit debate about the balance
between the encouragement of disclosure and the grant of monopoly.
A recent article in April 1995 entitled Patenting Mathematical Al-
gorithms, Floppy Disks, and Other Computer Program-Related Subject
Matter? (presented at the Computer Law Association Annual Law Up-
date) proposes that software patents be allowed solely on the basis of
utility and advanced the jarring proposition that formulae, including
E=mc2 , be patentable. This author thought the proposition that E=mc2
be patentable was so obscene that he was jarred into commencing this
article. Shortly thereafter, the PTO published its Request for Comments
on Proposed Examination Guidelines for Computer-Implemented In-
4. D.C. Toedt, Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, Floppy Disks, and Other Com-
puter Program-Related Subject Matter, THE 1995 COMPUTER & TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
UPDATE COURSE MATERIALS (The Computer Law Assn. 1995) [hereinafter Patenting
Mathematical Algorithms]; see also D.C. TOEDT III, THE LAW AND BusINESS OF COmPUTER
SoFrwARE (Clark Boardman Callaghan, Supp. 1995).
5. 413 U.S. 49, (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 92.
7. "The Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8. See 17 U.S.C. § 901 (1994).
9. Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4.
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ventions,'0 to which an earlier version of this article was submitted in
support of a comment. These guidelines were revised and are contained
in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure in the Chapter on Patent-
ability.' More recent revisions have been made to the Examining
Procedures. 2
In the recent case of In re Trovato,3 the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit vacated its earlier decision rejecting a claim and
"remanded [the case] for consideration in light of In re Alappat and any
new guidelines adopted by the Patent and Trademark Office for exami-
nation of computer-implemented inventions.1 4 A dissent to the vacaturs
complained that "[e]ven if new guidelines are adopted, they must yield
to precedent from this court and the Supreme Court, i.e. the law on sec-
tion 101."'"
These software patent guidelines for computer-implemented inven-
tions seem to render unpatentable formulae, music, and the like
embedded in software. The guidelines also happily clarify that data
storage devices will be patentable. However, this article agrees with the
Trovato dissent and suggests that the guidelines will not significantly
narrow the morass of conflicting case law about software programs.
B. Thesis and Summary of Proposed Test
The major thesis presented in this article is a focused standard of
software patentability, in particular for pure computational methods or
algorithms directed to the manipulation of numbers operating on a com-
puter. The general philosophy is to compel inventors to narrow their
claims to an algorithm expressed in terms of its utility and then to re-
quire that the particular utility or functionality be expressed in the claim
as a limit on the claim, thus precluding the patent monopoly from being
overbroad. As a corollary, any person is free to use or perhaps to patent
the algorithm for a different utility outside the claims. The standard is
consistent with existing statutes and with the trend which can be seen in
the case law favorable to software patents.
10. 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778 (proposed June 2, 1995) [hereinafter Proposed Guidelines].
11. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,
§ 2106, rev. 1 (1995) [hereinafter MPEP].
12. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 51 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 1262, at 422 (Jan. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Amended Guidelines].
13. 60 F.3d 807 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
14. Trovato, 60 F.3d at 807 (remanding an earlier decision rejecting claims to a method
for placing data in a data structure to solve a "shortest path problem," and a machine claim
combining "means for function" clauses to solve for a least cost path).
15. Id. at 808 (Nies, J., dissenting).
1995-19961
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The standard provides that software be patentable, even if the in-
vention effects only a transformation of numbers or data. The point of
novelty in all claims must be set forth in ternis of function directed to a
particular object to be achieved, not in terms of general function or
means plus function. A general restriction to a technological area is also
insufficient.
Specifically, the claim of the application of the software algorithm
must be narrowed to a defined set of utilities or applications. Those
utilities must be expressed in terms of manipulation of a particular input
of numbers directed to a technologically useful end.
Each of these criteria should be contained in the claim: (a) at least
an implicit understanding of the particular type of input covered by the
claim algorithm, or perhaps the actual description of input, (b) the ma-
nipulation or transformation that will occur, and (c) the object to be
achieved from the transformation and its functionality that operates as a
limitation set forth in the claim. Therefore, the claim must be substan-
tially in the form of:
What is claimed is:
a method embedded in a set of computer-translatable instruc-
tions comprising:
[recite steps]
so that input is [transformed] in conjunction with a computer
into [output of a specified character for a specified
[technologically useful application.]]
A corollary to requiring a statement of a claim having the concep-
tual framework of (a) input, (b) transforming function, and (c) object of
transformation is that it must be described in the English language, not
in a programming language. This is important to deal with the interest-
ing problem of expert systems that invent algorithms. A patent on a
method that, based on certain input, invents algorithms for a specified
purpose may be tolerable, but a patent on methods not able to be de-
scribed in the English language, which methods are for unspecified
purposes, should founder as likely too overbroad a grant of a monopoly.
If only a pure transformation of numbers is involved, the claim may
not only have to be narrow in its language of function directed to an
object or end result, but may also have to expressly state, in at least
broad terms, the type of input to which the function and transformation
is directed.
The software patent should describe and claim an invention that im-
proves an already known or obvious way to accomplish the claimed
1995-1996] A New Test for Software Patentability 5
function. Put more generally, the algorithm cannot be preemptive of the
only method to transform input to a certain output.
If a machine claim to a computational method operating on a com-
puter is allowed, the only type of machine claim allowable with respect
to the pure computational method will be a claim to a machine using
that specific allowable method. Means plus function clauses as elements
of a machine claim involving an algorithm or formula should generally
not be allowable unless the clauses precisely echo the steps of an allow-
able method claim. Disguised methods buried in a machine claim to a
computer-implemented invention are to be ferreted out and analyzed as
methods.
This required conceptual framework of a claim will give the public
the protection it needs from too broad a grant of a monopoly in favor of
the inventor, while receiving the disclosure of the formula or steps, and
will allow the inventor to practice the invention for a period of time and
for a particular purpose.
C. General Outline of Article
The article begins with a general overview of patent policy and a
selection of cases from the potpourri of decisions in the area of com-
puter-implemented inventions. A critique of other tests as a tool to forge
a new test is presented. The detailed test is presented and applied to a
number of examples, from both ends of the patentability spectrum, that
most courts would agree should and should not be patentable. This arti-
cle continues by discussing the constitutional background and details a
new standard. Judge Archer's dissent in In re Alappat16 is analyzed to
test and shape the proposed standard. The article then discusses the PTO
guidelines. Appropriate standards of patentability are examined for four
paradigms: (a) pure computational methods, (b) claims to programmed
apparatus, (c) claims to data structures, and (d) claims to program stor-
age devices.17
16. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
17. See generally Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4, i-ii.
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II. PATENT POLICY AND THE CONFUSION OF CURRENT LAW
A. Constitutional Policy
"The Patent Clause of the Constitution empowers the Congress to
'promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to... Inventors the exclusive right to their... Discoveries.' "'s
The Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the public's contract
of monopoly granted to an inventor, after 200 years of interpretation,
clearly exist for the benefit of the public-for "We the People." The
courts, which have the last word, along with the PTO have been appro-
priately cautious about newer technologies, particularly in terms of
allowing patents. Such caution should be dictated by the sure knowledge
that the framers of the Constitution had little understanding of the "laws
of nature"' 9 and science as we do today and certainly knew nothing of
the modem digital computer. Caution is important because we cannot
predict precisely how dangerous the allowance of an exclusive right will
be to limiting the advance of technology.
The aspirations of the previous paragraph can be translated into an
expectation of the public in return for its generous reward of a monop-
oly. That public expectation has two basic components: first, the public
expects to obtain disclosure so that the rest of the world can use what is
disclosed in new and useful ways. Second, the public expects the next
inventor, having reviewed the first inventor's disclosure, to be encour-
aged to have a new, useful, and non-obvious improvement. The public
then expects this inventor to apply for a patent and to disclose that new,
useful, non-obvious improvement, so that the cycle of invention will
continue. The patent monopoly, very simply, is a carrot to induce dis-
closure.
So-called natural laws, for which the courts have uniformly denied
patent protection,"O easily meet the first component of public expectation
because they are useful and new and because the public certainly desires
disclosure. However, they founder on the second component of public
expectation. There is no possible improvement to the natural law that
the next inventor can deliver for the public benefit. The natural law is
preemptive, and it stands alone as an unimprovable concept.
18. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8).
19. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (explaining that the Court has found
such things to be excluded from patent protection).
20. Id.
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The Supreme Court recognized this in a different way in Graham v.
John Deere Co.,21 when it observed that non-obviousness "draw[s] a line
between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of
an exclusive patent, and those which are not."' 2 From a natural law,
there will be no expected gain; thus, there is no policy reason for having
to descend to the disgrace of granting a monopoly. As a corollary, if the
monopoly grant is too broad, for policy reasons we simply determine
that the broad monopoly is not worth the disclosure and do not allow a
patent.
The Supreme Court articulated this concern in the area of software
patents by observing in Gottschalk v. Benson2 that "[tihe mathematical
formula involved here has no substantial practical application except in
connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment
below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm it-
self. 2 4 The facts of Benson involved a claim to an algorithm for
converting decimal numbers into binary numbers. Granting a patent on
a natural law (e.g., E=mc2, v=Zf, or Maxwel's equations), regardless
of whether it is encoded in a software program, would prevent patenting
future improvements based on that natural law.
However, the dilemma is still not resolved. We have discerned that
we do not desire patents on mathematical formulae containing a law of
nature, a scientific truth, or an abstract idea;2' we are comfortable with
existing tests in which formulae tied to structure are patentable. Yet,
what do we do about a terribly useful computer algorithm called a
"bubble sort," discussed later in this article, which is uniquely useful on
a computer?
B. Supreme Court Cases
The usual starting point in Supreme Court jurisprudence for soft-
ware patents is Gottschalk v. Benson.26 In that case, "the Supreme Court
held that claims to a method of converting binary-coded decimal num-
bers into pure decimal numbers did not recite an invention or discovery
within § 101, and thus were ineligible for patent protection."27
21. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
22. Id. at 9 (quoting BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 713 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1944)).
23. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
24. Id. at 71-72.
25. See Diamond, 450 U.S. at 185-86.
26. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane) (Archer, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)).
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The author submits that the Benson case must be viewed on its
facts, which presented serious novelty questions and extremely broad
claims. The Benson Court was extremely troubled that the formula
"sought to be patented was a mathematical formula that had no substan-
tial practical application except in connection with a digital computer,
... [and] the patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."'
The Supreme Court did infer that the patent law would need to "be
extended [i.e., amended] to cover these programs. '29 If that statement is
broadly viewed, it would once and for all eliminate software patents. As
subsequent cases would illustrate, the Court was not reaching that far,
but the Court's discomfort was and still is apparent.
The Benson case also made it clear that if a computer program, as a
general matter, is deemed to be a mathematical formula, then either
computer programs and software will not be patentable, or we will have
to resort to the fiction of declaring a software algorithm not to be a for-
mula. In sum, Benson has to be thought to be narrowed by technology
and later case law."
By 1978, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook3 was obviously
struggling to define patentability for what was clearly intended to be a
computerized process for updating an alarm limit which signaled an
abnormality in a catalytic chemical process. The Court observed that
there was no significant limitation on the use of the method in the
claims and denied the inventor his patent. The Court was also troubled
that:
[t]he chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hy-
drocarbons are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the
chemical process variables, the use of alarm limits to trigger
alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be recomputed
and readjusted, and the use of computers for "automatic moni-
toring-alarming." (emphasis added)33
A known method embodied in software should not be patentable
under any standard, including that set forth in this article. In Flook, the
28. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
29. Id. at72.
30. Another shibboleth to invalidate software patents which appears shelved is the
"mental processes" doctrine. Pamela Samuelson, Revisited: The Case Against Patent Pro-
tection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1025, 1043 (1990).
31. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
32. Id. at 585-86.
33. Id. at 594 (footnote omitted).
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Court rejected the "notion that post-solution activity, ... can transform
an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. .. "14
By the time of Diamond v. Diehr,35 the Supreme Court conceded
that integration of a digital computer and software programs with "post-
solution activity" would render an invention eligible for a patent.36 The
facts of that case involved the integration of the Arrhenius equation with
a method of operating a rubber molding machine while monitoring the
cure of a rubber product being processed.37 In the recent case of In re
Alappat,3" Chief Judge Archer summarized the conclusions of the Su-
preme Court in Benson and Diehr as follows:
Under [these cases] the posing and solution of a mathematical
Flook function is non-statutory subject matter. It is non-
statutory even if the particular mathematics is limited to per-
formance in digital electronic circuitry or a general purpose
digital computer, even if the mathematical operations are al-
leged generally to have some application in one or various
technologies, and even if the solution of the function is said
generally to "represent" something of physical or technologic
relevance. On the other hand, an invention or discovery of a
process or product in which a mathematical operation is practi-
cally applied may be statutory subject matter. The fact that one
element of the claimed process or product is a programmed
digital computer or digital electronics performing a mathemati-
cal function does not necessarily preclude patent protection for
the process or product. In this way, the door remains open to the
advancement of technologies by the incorporation of digital
electronics. But the mere association of digital electronics or a
general purpose digital computer with a newly discovered
mathematical operation does not per se bring that mathematical
operation within the patent law.39
C. The Federal Circuit
The Federal Circuit's majority conclusion in In re Alappat and the
conventional wisdom have been that so long as there is significant
post-solution activity or sufficient physical structure associated with a
34. Id. at 590.
35. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
36. Id. at 191-93.
37. Id. at 177-81.
38. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
39. Id. at 1557 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1995-1996]
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software claim, the Supreme Court would likely allow a patent on the
proposed invention. °
As evidenced by the fifty-one page dissent by Chief Judge Archer in
In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit has not settled comfortably to any
conclusions in the software patent area. In re Alappat was an en banc
climax to a difficult decade of cases.
Prior to In re Alappat, the test for patentability of computer-
implemented inventions was referred to as the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test. The test was and is too narrow to allow any significant patent, and
arguably any patent at all, on traditional software.1 In essence, the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test is (a) "whether the claim directly or indi-
rectly recites an 'algorithm' in the Benson sense of that term,"42 (b)
"whether in its entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm,, 43 (c) whether
the algorithm is "applied in any manner to physical elements or process
steps," 4 and (d) whether the invention's "application is circumscribed
by more than a field of use limitation or non-essential post-solution ac-
tivity.' '45 The Freeman component of the test is whether the claim recites
an algorithm and whether it preempts the algorithm." This part of the
test is useful for the proposed test with some clarification. The Walter
component of the test requires application to physical elements or proc-
ess steps, but rejects a field of use limitation as a useful analytical tool.47
By requiring a "physical aspect" or application to statutorily allowable
process steps (implying a requisite physical transformation), the Walter
component renders unpatentable the pure transformation of numbers
such as sorting. The Abele component of the test softens the Walter
component by providing that if the claim presents statutory subject
matter without the algorithm, it likewise is statutory with the algo-
rithm.' Unfortunately, reference is made in the context of the phrase
"[must be] otherwise statutory," (e.g., statutory subject matter without
the algorithm) to the phrase: "albeit inoperative or less useful without
40. Id. at 1560 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Pat-
enting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4; Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at
28,780; MPEP, supra note 11, § 2106; Amended Guidelines, supra note 12, at IV.B.2.e.
41. The test is described in both Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4,
§ 6.03, and in an article of the eminent Professor Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 U. PrrT. L. REV. 959, 1003 (1986). See also In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902
(C.C.P.A. 1982).
42. Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245; see also Chisum, supra note 41, at 1002-03.
43. Id. at 1245; see also Chisum, supra note 41, at 1002-03.
44. Walter, 618 F.2d at 767; see also Chisum, supra note 41, at 1003.
45. Abele, 684 F.2d at 907; see also Chisum, supra note 41, at 1003.
46. Chisum, supra note 41, at 1002-03.
47. Id. at 1003.
48. Id.
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the algorithm." '49 In order for the claim to be "otherwise statutory," it
must have some physical aspect. The requirement of a physical aspect
effectively eliminates patents for inventions which only consist of the
pure transformation of numbers." It is hard to see how a test against
"inoperative or less useful" statutory subject matter will be productive;
thus, a different direction is taken in this article to focus on transforma-
tion directed to a functional object.
In the majority opinion of In re Alappat, the Federal Circuit, sitting
en banc, characterized the invention as relating "generally to a means
for creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope."'"
Based on the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. §112(6), the Federal Cir-
cuit held that means plus function elements had sufficient physical
structure inherent in an electronic machine to be patentable:
Although many, or arguably even all, of the means elements re-
cited in claim 15 represent circuitry elements that perform
mathematical calculations, which is essentially true of all digital
electrical circuits, the claimed invention as a whole is directed
to a combination of interrelated elements which combine to
form a machine for converting discrete waveform data samples
into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed
on a display means. This is not a disembodied mathematical
concept which may be characterized as an "abstract idea," but
rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tan-
gible result.52
The vacated holding in In re Trovato contained a few hints on how
at least one panel of the Federal Circuit felt about software patents. 3
The invention at issue, in substance, was a patent on a solution method
to a critical path problem or "shortest path problem." A method for
storing data in order to enable a solution was claimed as well as a
method disguised as a machine which, in a series of means for function
elements, claimed a "means for identifying a least cost path between
two positions in the discretized representation based on the respective
costs."' 4 The Trovato court correctly concluded that the claims were to
a mathematical algorithm. The only physical step seemed to be a
computer readout. Yet, the Trovato court seemed to leave open, how-
ever slightly, a window of opportunity for a patent: "Without further
49. Id.
50. Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
51. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
52. Id. at 1544 (footnotes omitted).
53. In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated, 60 F.3d 807 (1995).
54. Id. at 1378.
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application or connection to a technical art, we cannot say that
Trovato's claims pass muster under the alternative analysis of statutory
subject matter expressed in Warmerdam. 55
The facts of Warmerdam involved a bubble hierarchy scheme to di-
rect a robot. A claim was allowed. The alternative analysis seemed to
involve determining whether the claim was merely to an abstract idea. 6
One of the reasons a new approach and test is proposed for software
patents is that the requirement of "physical structure" is perverse and
has been perverted, notably reaching a climax in the recently proposed
PTO Guidelines for Computer-Implemented Inventions. 7 Essentially,
the Proposed Guidelines and the In re Alappat majority conclude that if
the Supreme Court wants structure, "we'll give them structure": i.e.,
"means plus function" elements will be sufficient structure to allow a
patent on an algorithm. Requiring inventors to call an apple an orange,
that is to call the algorithm embedded in software a "means plus func-
tion" instead of a "method step," is a venture on the wrong track which
will grant a monopoly without encouraging disclosure. Moreover,
"means plus function" clauses tend to be broad. An important objective
of allowing any claims to algorithms embedded in computer programs is
to limit their breadth and, in particular, not to encompass future undis-
covered "means plus function" inventions. Such limitation is necessary
in order to avoid the preemption issue rightly raised in Benson.58
I. DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW TEST BASED ON SAMPLE ENGINEERING
PROBLEMS AND BASED ON SEMNAL CASES IN THE PATENT LAW
A. A Spectrum of Examples Illustrating Why a Pure
Utility Test Is Inadequate
An understandable example of a formula that crosses the spectrum
from pure unpatentable formula to a formula easily contained in a patent
is the basic wave speed calculation algorithm, v=Af. The meaning of
this mathematical formula is that the speed of a wave is equal to its
wavelength X, times its frequency f. This formula pointedly illustrates
why a pure utility test, as proposed in Patenting Mathematical Algo-
rithms,9 is not socially desirable or consistent with U.S. patent policy.
55. Id. at 1381 (citing In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed Cir. 1994)).
56. Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1359.
57. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10. See also MPEP, supra note 11; Amended
Guidelines, supra note 12.
58. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
59. Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4.
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Posit the allowance of the following claim to calculate wavelength:
What is claimed is:
1. A method of calculation of the speed v of a wave calculated
according to the formula, v=;Lf where . is the wavelength
and f is the frequency.
Assume the claim is supported by a disclosure in the context of
measuring the wavelength of sound. The claim and disclosure clearly
have utility. Under the proposed "utility-only" standard of Patenting
Mathematical Algorithms, this formula, when discovered, upon suitable
application, should have been patentable.
The inventor who obtained a patent including this claim would have
discovered that he can always know the wavelength of sound if he
measures the pitch (a musician's term for the frequency) because the
inventor "knows" by physical measurement that the speed of sound is
approximately 110 meters per second.
What the inventor did not know is that the speed of sound in a par-
ticular medium varies. What neither the patent office nor the inventor
knew was that the formula also applied to the speed of light. Once this
was discovered, the inventor would be delighted with the breadth of his
or her monopoly.
The following week, Einstein realizes that this is a great formula.
He theorizes that the speed of light is always constant at a velocity c. He
decides to use the formula to determine the smallest opening that a
camera lens may have for a given frequency of light in order to take
pictures without the Fresnel effect. He proposes to use the formula
v=Zf in the following way: for a speed of light v and for a frequency of
light f, which he would have managed to measure, he proposes to de-
termine the wavelength of light , according to the formula v=,Lf. Then,
he would propose to apply that calculation of X to determine the small-
est opening (what we now call the "f stop") on a camera lens for a given
wavelength. There is no question that Einstein would have wanted to
produce such a camera, given the size of the camera market. Most
importantly, and in rebuttal to the proposition that such pure formu-
lae should be patentable solely based on their utility, there is no
question that Einstein would have needed to use the formula v=2f.
60. The Fresnel effect in a camera lens can be described as follows: If light is passed
through a sufficiently small opening, it will diffract, causing the appearance of alternating
bands of black and the color. Because a camera lens is circular, these appear on a photograph
as rings and distort the photograph.
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In this hypothetical, he would likely have infringed the formula claim
set forth above, if that claim were allowable.
There is also no question that the claim in a patent for the camera
built with an opening determined according to the formula v=2f would
be patentable under existing case law. We feel good about this patent. It
is the opposite extreme of a formula patent. It has that traditional look
and feel of "structure."
The previously referenced article entitled Patenting Mathematical
Algorithms, after discussing the unsteady course of jurisprudence in the
software patent area, proposes that utility be the sole test for statutory
subject matter. The most jarring proposition advanced is:
Under a Chakrabarty-inspired statutory utility analysis, Ein-
stein's equation E=mc2 or the Pythagorean theorem a2+b2=c2
might have been potentially patentable, notwithstanding con-
trary dicta in Flook and Chakrabarty and Chief Judge Archer's
concern in his Alappat dissent. Each of these equations is sim-
ply a convenient notational representation-no less and no
more-of a computational method, a human-created mathe-
matical modeling process, that includes data-gathering and
multiplication steps to generate an approximation of a real-
world natural phenomenon. Likewise, the familiar equation
NaCl €* Na+ + Cl- serves as a shorthand expression of a
mathematical modeling process for predicting sodium-[sic] and
chloride ionization in an aqueous salt solution.
Einstein's equation, the Pythagorean theorem, and the sodium
choride [sic] ionization equation cannot properly be considered
"laws of nature" [and should therefore be patentable] ....
The human origin and imperfect nature of such equations is high-
lighted by the fact that their accuracy is always an issue. As a well-
known example, the modeling process expressed notationally as New-
ton's second law of motion, F=m(dx2 /dt) or more commonly F=ma, has
proved to be unacceptable for predicting or explaining relativistic or
quantum phenomena. Flook was therefore wrong in asserting in dicta
that "a scientific principle, such as that expressed in [Flook's] algo-
rithm, reveals a relationship that has already existed.'
The author of this article therefore disagrees that utility should be
the sole test. The formula v=2Af has near universal application, and, in
contrast to the Patenting Mathematical Algorithms reference that for-
mulae that are natural laws function only as an approximation, this
61. Patenting MathematicalAlgorithms, supra note 4, § 6.04 (footnotes omitted).
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particular formula appears to have application in all known fields of
technology, including quantum mechanics. 2 The argument of approxi-
mation as a justification for a pure utility test would therefore founder.
B. The "Bubble Sort" and the Critical Requirement
of a "Transformation"
Turning to a pure software example, the "bubble sort" is an example
of pure manipulation of numbers that is understandable in one reading
of this article and is an algorithm that the author believes would have
deserved patent protection. The reason one can feel comfort about pat-
enting the bubble sort algorithm is that it transforms a set of numbers
into a different set of numbers in a useful way.
Suppose you have a list of n numbers and you are directed to sort it
in ascending order. Most of us search the list and look for the smallest
number and write that down on a separate list. We then look at the list
and search for the next largest number. We repeat this until we are at the
end of the first list.
Put another way, we pick a number, see if it is the smallest com-
pared to the list, and reject it back to the list or select it as the new
"smallest." Once we see it is the smallest, we put it on a separate list
and start over.
One can compute that for a list of n numbers-you have to look at n
numbers the first run, n-1 the second run (because the result from the
first search is removed), n-2 the third run, and so on until one number is
left which must be the highest remaining. As it turns out, n(n-1)/2
searches are required. This means that this method of sorting consumes
a number of comparisons in proportion to n2 .
In the middle 1960's, a creative person devised a method which this
author learned as "bubble sorting." Bubble sorting called for all num-
bers to be placed in a triangularly shaped set of nodes which we called a
tree, with the point, or top, of the tree placed arbitrarily at the top of the
page. A number was placed at the upper point of the tree, two numbers
were placed in the first level down and "linked" to the top number, four
numbers were placed in the second level in two "sets of two" "linked"
respectively to the two numbers above, and so on until the list of num-
bers to be sorted was exhausted. A rough figure of the first three levels
is set forth below, with the circles corresponding to nodes in which
numbers would be written and in which the lines constitute links with
the "next bubble up."
62. The universal application is subject only to difficulty of measurement and verifica-
tion at a quantum mechanic level because of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle.
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As we all know, few lists to be sorted are completely out of order.
Usually, there are at least a few low numbers in front of some higher
numbers on the list, simply because of random distribution. The bubble
sort takes advantage of this phenomenon. The basic principle is that
starting at the bottom right comer, if a number is lower than the leftmost
number in its own triad, it is exchanged with that number. Then, the
leftmost number is compared to the top node in the triad. If the leftmost
number is lower than the top number in the triad, the numbers are ex-
changed, and the algorithm is worked backward through the triad and
any lower levels, but such working backwards is only done if an ex-
change of numbers at a higher level occurs. For a list of n numbers in
base 10, the sort can be shown to function at a magnitude of n x loglon
comparisons.
The relative advantage of the bubble sort may not seem large if n is
100, for it is the difference between 200 and 9900/2. But make that list
one million numbers, and the difference in magnitude is the difference
between six million and one trillion/2 comparisons.
Now that's an improvement! It is the pure manipulation of numbers.
It is not particularly useful to employ this algorithm by hand because it
is awkward mechanically; you have to erase too many times as you
"bubble" the numbers up and down. This author submits that if a person
invented a software program to do that and wrote the claim in such a
way that the monopoly is not too broad, "We the People" would very
much like to have that disclosure. Under the standard to be proposed in
this article, when someone could figure out how to sort for a purpose
not claimed by the inventor, or how to sort by using different steps than
those claimed by the inventor (in fact, there are several different sets of
steps), that person too could have a patent.
The concept of transformation is key to resolution of a feeling of
comfort about software patents and determination of a practical stan-
dard. 'Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines."63 The reason one can feel comfort about
63. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981).
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the bubble sort algorithm is that it transforms a set of numbers into a
different set of numbers in a useful way.
Transformation is defined in terms of the word "transform": "v.t. 1.
to change in form, appearance, or structure; metamorphose. 2. to change
in condition, nature, or character; convert... v.i. 6. to undergo a
change in form, appearance, or character; become transformed .... 'A
Courts are now comfortable with a patent that employs pure natural
laws or formulae to determine how elements may be structured into an
invention,--e.g., the camera example above using the formula v=Af to
determine the smallest possible lens opening.6 5 The author, and many
others, would be comfortable with a software patent on this pure ma-
nipulation of numbers, despite the author's obvious hostility to a patent
on the mathematical formulae v=Af or E=mc2.
As will be seen however, transformation plus pure utility cannot be
the only test. The foundation for why it may not be the only test lies in
constitutional authorization and policy. The solution will lie in the con-
cept of transformation plus utility directed to an objective.
C. Matrices and the Requirement of Transformation Plus Utility
1. Mere Transformation Plus Utility Is Not Sufficiently
Narrow for Software Patents
A review of matrix algebra illustrates why a test having only the re-
quirements of utility and transformation of a data set will still raise the
hurdle too high for future disclosure and will not achieve the second
component of public expectation. Another factor will be required in any
practical standard.
Matrices are wonderful objects that can achieve remarkable effi-
ciencies. They are especially useful in several classes of problems
generally referred to as optimization problems, requirements problems,
Markov processes with multiple states, and transportation problems. A
classic example of a network problem is determining the shortest or
"critical" path through a series of steps which may require certain pre-
requisites before performance. A construction project of a building or a
spacecraft is a good example of a network problem. Remanufacturing or
programming projects are another example. A transportation problem is
the problem of how to move a required number of goods or services
64. THE RANDoM HousE COLLEGE DIcTIONARY 1395 (rev. ed. 1982).
65. See generally Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (discussing when a mathe-
matical formula can validly be included in a patent claim for a rubber curing process).
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over a series of given routes in an optimal way between a given set of
origins and destinations.
A matrix is a table of numbers. Assume it has m rows and n col-
umns. It may be multiplied by any matrix that has n rows. Assume the
second matrix has p columns. The matrix yielded on the multiplication
of the first matrix A (an m x n matrix) by matrix B (an n x p matrix) is a
matrix C (an m x p matrix). Assume rows are indexed and referred to by
an index "T and columns are indexed and referred to by an index "j." A
particular element of matrix A, for instance in the "'i'th row" and in the
"'j'th" column, is thus referred to as ai-. A particular element of matrix
B in the "'i'th row" and in the "'j'th column" is referred to as bij.[a,1  a,21 -b1,I b 1 2  b1 ,3 C 1  C1 ,2  C1,3
a 2,1  a2.2/X b b "-- C2,1 C2,2 C2,3
a 3 1  a 3,2  2 2C3, 1  C3 ,2 C3,3
In the above example, a 3x2 matrix multiplied by a 2x3 matrix
yields a 3x3 matrix.
Indexing rows on an index "i" and columns on an index "j," any
particular element Ci of matrix C will be
n
Ci,y = 1: Aik akj
k=1
The layman's way of doing this is as follows: the elements of the
first row of matrix A are set next to the elements of the first column of
matrix B, each set of juxtaposed elements is multiplied together, the
products are added up, and the sum is the new element in the first row
and first column of the new matrix C.
Even as first symbolized and invented, this formula should not be
protected in a software patent. It clearly transforms a data set (just as a
bubble sort transforms a data set). It can be done by hand or faster by
computer. Yet, to allow this algorithm to be patentable would raise a
hurdle to the entire science of operations research for an extended pe-
riod of time. Optimal solutions in operations research problems attempt
to select an extreme point in a multidimensional analysis on the so-
called "polyhedral cone" by using matrix algebra, including matrix
multiplication. 6 A patent on the matrix algebra of multiplication be-
cause it satisfies the requirements of utility and transformation would
66. See generally HARVEY M. WAGNER, PRINCIPLES OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, §§ 3.4-
3.6 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 2d ed. 1975) (discussing polyhedral cones and their use in solving
linear optimization problems).
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close off technological development in too broad a fashion. Embodying
the formula in a machine, i.e., embedding it in hardware or embedding it
in software, would not resolve the public's concerns. Any standard must
thus involve more than the mere requirement of transformation.
One solution to consider as a requirement for a patent would be the
concept of a "short-cut," an improved method over an old method. Let
us suppose a software program written in a novel way enables the ma-
trix multiplication to be short-cut. In fact, there exist just such short-cuts
in matrix multiplication which are used to solve particular kinds of net-
work and transportation problems.
Unfortunately, the concept of allowing a patent because an algo-
rithm is a short-cut is overbroad. For instance, to allqw a patent on a
method of solving any and all network or transportation problems
merely because the newly-invented method is a short-cut would be
overbroad. The fact that the problem could be solved in a lengthier
manner is still not satisfactory. In other words, the proposed patent for
the short-cut is not preemptive. There still must be a further limitation
on the patent monopoly to avoid an overbroad reach.
For a specific example, if Dantzig's simplex algorithm,6 7 known as
the Simplex Method of solving linear programming problems, had been
patented without limit because it had utility and effected a transforma-
tion, the science of operations research would have been severely
impeded. Although Dantzig's simplex algorithm was not the only means
of solution of operations research problems, it was a substantially im-
proved method of Gaussian elimination which eliminated many trial
and error steps in a large problem. 9 It is very troublesome that embed-
ding these algorithms in software that abstractly transforms numbers
would bar the rest of the world from using them, absent paying a mo-
nopoly price. The same argument about monopoly price, of course, has
been made concerning patents generally, and a more humanly-
compelling argument can be made about medical devices. In contrast to
medical devices, however, the author submits that the broad and unan-
ticipated uses of formulae and algorithms raise issues of wider concern
because the purposes for which formulae or algorithms can be used are
infinite, and usually the universe of possible uses is unknown at the out-
set of the patent process. It is even more troubling if there is no
compulsory licensing because large fields of a basic building block can
67. Id. § 4.4.
68. Id. § 4.2.
69. Dantzig's algorithm offered a far more rapid convergence on a solution. This algor-
tihm is still important in the advanced world of incredibly fast, massive supercomputers. See
id. §§ 4.2-4.3.
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be arbitrarily blocked off. Medical devices have a more limited universe
of applications and realistically present fewer concerns in this area. The
solution to the troublesome concern of allowing patents on broadly use-
ful algorithms embedded in software requires close attention to
narrowing the claims to a specified function or list of functions that are
technologically useful. It also will require courts to focus closely on
abuse of monopoly power if a software program, as claimed, turns out
to have broad reach and if the proposed license fees are disproportionate
to the research and development costs. Note that the production costs of
software, which are largely limited to copying and distribution, are al-
most irrelevant to the price of software.
2. Transformation Directed to a Utilitarian Object and
Using that Object as a Limitation
on the Scope of Claim
In the last century, an important advance in medical science was the
use of sulfuric ether as an anesthetic. In the case in which the patent on
that use was held invalid, the court stated important principles which are
applicable to and translatable to the software patent area."
The Morton court held, "[t]he new force or principle brought to
light must be embodied and set to work, and can be patented only in
connection or combination with the means by which, or the medium
through which, it operates." '71
The second clause of this holding which reads, "only in connection
or in combination with means by which, or the medium through which,
it operates, '2 should be a necessary element to a software patent, i.e.,
the claim must specify the method is implemented on a computer
(analog or digital), that is the medium through which software operates.
The first clause from the Morton quotation reads, "the new force or
principle brought to light must be embodied and set to work."73 In this
clause lies an important and useful element of test for software patent-
ability.
It is not mere utility that makes the claim and invention patentable;
software is useful as are formulae, and this statutory requirement must
continue. It is not a limitation to method-of-transformation claims only;
70. Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No.
9865).
71. Id. at 884. The court also noted that a method must act on something "material,"
that narrowness of vision in the computer age is the vise with which the courts are now
grappling. Information is power and advances in the ability to manipulate numbers and in-
formation really are advances in technology that are useful.
72. Morton, 17 F. Cas. at 884.
73. Id.
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a method or process is implicit in every algorithm. This should be a
necessary recitation of any claim.
It is most important to narrow the claim to how it is "embodied and
set to work" as the Morton court required. The claim of a formula or
algorithm must be narrowed from the application-the transformation
effected-of the software algorithm to a defined set of utilities or appli-
cations. Those utilities should be in terms of manipulation of a
particular input of numbers directed to a technologically useful end.
Each of these criteria should be contained in the claim: (a) at least an
implicit understanding of the particular type of input covered by the
claim algorithm (or perhaps the actual description of input), (b) the ma-
nipulation or transformation that will occur, and (c) the object to be
achieved from the transformation and its functionality that operate as a
limitation set forth in the claim.
One can speculate that the reason the Supreme Court finally ac-
cepted patents on algorithms is that the effect of requiring post-solution
activity or structure is to necessarily limit the claim to "an object to be
achieved from the transformation and its functionality that operate as a
limitation set forth in the claim" as proposed above. For example, the
claim in Diehr which used the Arrhenius equation was limited to a rub-
ber curing process in a particular way; the claim was self-limiting, even
with the abstract formula contained in the claim.74 The test in this article
is intended to be consistent with and better express the aspiration of the
courts for a limited patent in a new area of technology.
3. Other Necessary Aspects: English Language Description
of Method, Lack of Preemption by the Algorithm,
and Demonstrable Reduction to Practice
a. Setting Forth the Method in the English Language
A corollary to these required criteria is that the claim must be de-
scribed in the English language, not in a programming language. This is
important to deal with the interesting problem of expert systems that
invent algorithms. A patent on a method that, based on certain input,
invents algorithms for a specified purpose may be tolerable, but a patent
on the undescribed methods for unspecified purposes should founder
because it is too overbroad a grant of a monopoly. It is also important to
74. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177-80, 187 (1981) (making clear that the
monopoly on a mathematical formula extends only to its use in the computer-controlled
process).
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address the issue of a new short-cut method which will be discussed
below.
This required conceptual framework of a claim will give the public
the protection it needs from too broad a grant of a monopoly in favor of
the inventor, while receiving the disclosure of the formula or steps, and
will allow the inventor a period of time for a particular purpose to prac-
tice his or her invention.
b. The Algorithm Must Not "Pre-empt" the Field; It Cannot Be the Only
Method of Accomplishing the Result Nor a Description of a
Previously Unknown Relationship or Principle
Another important standard that should be met to prevent an over-
broad monopoly is in the area of preemption. The software patent
should describe and claim an invention that improves an already known
or obvious way to accomplish the claimed function. To return to the
bubble sort example, it is not the sorting that should be patentable-it is
the new and useful mechanism of sorting. The Supreme Court in Parker
v. Flook7 realized this in a different way by observing that "a scientific
principle, such as that expressed in [Flook's] algorithm, reveals a rela-
tionship that has already existed. 76 If there were no other way to sort
numbers that were known, the bubble sort should not be patentable; it
would, if there were no other way to sort, not reveal what we already
know can be done. The same is true for matrix multiplication. If a pure
computational method invention does not reveal a relationship that al-
ready exists, it is too basic, and the hurdle for the next inventor's
disclosure will be too high; e.g., Einstein will not be able to use c=Af in
his camera patent if v=if is already patented. However, a disclaimer to
the basic formula in a patent containing a new revelation directed to an
object should be acceptable.
Turning to the Benson case, the Court concluded that "[t]he method
sought to be patented varies the ordinary arithmetic steps a human
would use by changing the order of the steps, changing the symbolism
for writing the multiplier used in some steps, and by taking subtotals
after each successive operation."77 The Court concluded that was very
troubled that "[t]he mathematical formula involved here has no sub-
stantial practical application except in connection with a digital
computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the pat-
75. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
76. Flook at 593 n.15 (1978).
77. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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ent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."
78
Returning to the example of v=Af, this preemption of the formula is
why it should only be claimed in the context of a function to transform
certain input into certain output. "If there is to be invention from such a
discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a
new and useful end., 79 This also overcomes the criticism in Benson that
the "'process' claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known
and unknown uses of the BCD [binary-coded decimal] to pure binary
conversion."8 The Court noted a broad variety of functions covered."
The mere combination of a formula with a digital computer should
be inadequate because it falls to satisfy the concept of novelty, not be-
cause there is anything intrinsically unpatentable about the combination
with a digital computer. Based on Justice Douglas' conclusion in Ben-
son v. Gottschalk that the method "varie[d] ordinary arithmetic steps a
human would use by changing the order of the steps," the patent
should fail on that basis alone.
To be intellectually honest, a computer program always uses a se-
ries of steps, i.e., a method, as Professor Allen Newell (a computer
scientist, a non-lawyer, and non-patent practitioner) observed. 3 Those
steps are usually a program, i.e., software directing a computer. Newell
defines an algorithm as, "an unambiguous specification of a conditional
sequence of steps or operations for solving a class of problems." This
is inherently a process or method in the author's view, and all software
claims must be first analyzed in that context.
c. There Must Be a Demonstrable Reduction to Practice
Unlike traditional patent law, which usually does not require a
working copy of the invention but only requires that one can be created,
there should be a requirement of availability of a working copy-an
actual reduction to practice-unless a step in the working copy (or more
likely a program module) can be described and is disclosed, cited, and
known in the art. In that case, only the novel steps need be disclosed,
and a depository copy of that portion need be delivered to the PTO. This
78. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
79. Id. at 67 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
80. Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 67.
83. Allen Newell, Response: The Models are Broken, the Models are Broken!, 47 U.
PiT. L. REv. 1023, 1024-25 (1986).
84. Id. at 1024.
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is key in order to limit software patents to patents on which new discov-
eries and inventions may be built.
The requirement of the test for a depository copy is not to restrict
claims to a particular programming language nor to allow the next pat-
ent based on an artificial distinction of a new programming language for
an old method. This is another reason for an English language disclo-
sure of the method or modules to the method. Professor Newell
correctly argues that an algorithm is broader than a computer program;
an algorithm may be programmed in a number of computer languages."
This is an important distinction that must be observed. Having broadly
reviewed the standards that are needed, we turn to a specific test for a
software patent.
IV. A TEST FOR SOFTWARE PATENT CLAIMS
Previously, four paradigms from the article Patenting Mathematical
Algorithms86 for computer-related inventions were set out: (1) claims to
a pure computational method or "algorithm," (2) claims to programmed
apparatus, (3) claims to data structures, and (4) claims to program stor-
age devicesY The first is the most difficult and is the pure "software
patent." Claims to programmed apparatus will be addressed later in the
context of the discussion of claims to pure computational methods.
A. What Is a Pure Computational Method Claim?
The first trigger for the test should be whether or not the claim is di-
rected (a) to a pure computational method or algorithm method or (b) to
an article of manufacture using means plus function clauses and
equivalents thereof which should be analyzed as though it actually was
directed to a method comprising the functions performed by the claimed
means.88
Based on the gloss in the case law, a pure computational method or
algorithm method means, "Does the claimed invention involve a
mathematical algorithm, and if so, is there (a) insignificant post-solution
activity and (b) no transformation or determination of physical structure
in the claim?" If the answer to the question is "yes," then the claim is a
pure computational method. The test is not intended to permit stretching
85. Id. at 1029-30.
86. See Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4.
87. Patenting MathematicalAlgorithms, supra note 4, § 6.03.
88. Ex Parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340, 1344-45 (Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences 1992); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); see
also In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481,486 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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of the concept of structure in order to evade the necessity of satisfying
the test.
B. The Test for Patentability of a Pure Computational Method Claim
In order for a software patent claim to a pure computational method
or mathematical algorithm to be allowable, the inventor bears the bur-
den of showing:
(a) the pure computational method or mathematical algorithm,
which will be collectively referred as a pure computational method,
must be an unambiguous specification of a conditional sequence of
mathematical steps or mathematical operations for solving a class of
problems." If it is not unambiguous, the claim should be rejected under
section 112" as indefinite, and potentially be rejected under section
101.l9
Further, a pure computational method or algorithm method, for pur-
pose of determining whether the specific test in this article is applicable
under the patent laws, means: "Does the claimed invention involve a
mathematical algorithm, and if so, is there (1) insignificant post-
solution activity, and (2) no transformation or determination of physical
structure in the claim?"
If the answer to the question is "yes," then the claim is a pure com-
putational method and must be carefully analyzed in accordance with
this test. If not, traditional principles of patent examination and allow-
ability are satisfactory, including principles in the cases requiring
substantial post-solution activity or physical transformation. The test is
not intended to permit stretching of the concept of structure in order to
evade the necessity of satisfying the test in this article.
(b) only a method is being claimed, and any claim for a machine
utilizing the method is confined to a specific method and that specific
method meets the test below.
(c) the pure computational method is not substantially a natural
phenomenon, an abstract idea, a law of nature or the like.
(d) The disclosure must demonstrate that the method utilizes and
embeds in software a scientific or mathematical relationship or formula
that has already existed, or disclaim a just-discovered relationship, and
the disclosure must demonstrate that the method is not the sole method
to transform input into the desired output. The claim cannot be so ab-
stract and sweeping as to cover unknown uses of the algorithm (and by
89. Newell, supra note 83, at 1024.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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stating its transforming function and so limiting the claim, must claim
only known uses) nor may it wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula
or algorithm and in practical effect be a patent on the formula or algo-
rithm itself. A disclaimer in the patent to any portion of the method that
is substantially a mathematical formula, a natural phenomena, an ab-
stract idea, a law of nature or the like should normally be effective not
to pre-empt a mathematical formula or algorithm.
In particular this requirement will exclude fundamental formulae
such as v=ALf. However, the fact that the software method may be more
substantially more efficient and cost-effective than a previous method is
not indicative that the software is the sole method. If it is substantially a
mathematical formula,
(e) the pure computational method must be embodied in a soft-
ware program.
(f) the pure computational method must achieve a utilitarian
function, i.e., a technologically useful application, and in particular the
object of that utilitarian function must be patentable under existing law
(aside from the existing law on computer algorithms for which this is a
new test); in particular, a method of doing business is not patentable.
The method must be directed to a technologically useful application.
Such an application may be manipulating data for a business purpose.
The focus of the claim must be on the manipulation; the "transforming"
must be on a data set. The focus cannot be on claiming a business
method as the transforming function. A "method of doing business"
should be as presently defined under existing case law. Generally, a
claim to system for doing business is not patentable, as opposed to a
means for carrying out the system,92 or as opposed to a method of cal-
culation for the system. An algorithm to find a critical path among an
abstract set of input to generate output for a specified business purpose
is acceptable because the patent is on the algorithm and the specified
business purpose limits the scope of the claim so others can use the al-
gorithm.
(g) the pure computational method must be drafted in terms of the
just-referenced utilitarian function to accomplish a stated practical ap-
plication, which function for a stated practical application is a limitation
of the claim. This means that the claim must be substantially in the form
of:
92. In re Patton, 127 F. 2d 324, 327 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (holding "that a system for trans-
acting business, apart from the means for carrying out the system, is [not patentable subject
matter]").
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What is claimed is:
a method embedded in a set of computer-translatable instruc-
tions comprising:
[recite steps in terms of present participles: doing something to
input, or to input transformed by a prior step]
so that input is [transformed] in conjunction with a computer
into [output of a specified character for a specified technologi-
cally useful application.]
An alternative form of claim is:
What is claimed is:
a method embedded in a set of computer-translatable instruc-
tions comprising:
[recite steps in terms of present participles: doing something to
input, or to input transformed by a prior step]
in order to [transform] input in conjunction with a computer
into [output of a specified character for a specified technologi-
cally useful application.]
Put another way, a patent should be allowable on a method for using
a computer to transform "A" to "B" according to a formula or algorithm
in order to generate machine readable information to do something of
practical value or so that something of practical value is done. The rea-
son for the requirement that the pure computational method be
embedded in a set of computer instructions is that if the pure computa-
tional method is not utilized on a computer, and if it is a pure
computational method, it should not be patentable. This is consistent
with existing law.93 Generally, the public has no interest in allowing a
series of "hand-run" mathematical steps to be patented.
(h) the input must be a set of numbers of a specific type or char-
acter derived from a specific source. The input to the pure
computational method must be apparent from the claim, not merely the
disclosure, to enable a person reasonably skilled in the art to determine
if transformation according the claim of certain input is encompassed in
the claim. Merely referring to the input as a set of numbers will not do;
it must be a set of numbers derived from a [specified] source of a par-
ticular type or character. In some circumstances, it will be obvious from
93. Mackay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939), cited in Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 67-68 (1972), Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981), and Arrhythmia
Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the claim what the input must be. For example, if the claim stated:
"What is claimed is a method comprising: multiplying a matrix com-
posed of [a set of characteristics of a generally described set of
chemicals] [in a particular way that transforms the data set] ... in order
to determine [a proper mix ratio]," the input is sufficiently clear and the
designation of particular chemicals or their brand name should not nor-
mally be required.
(i) Unless (1) all means of accomplishing a means plus function
element are obvious and well-known in the art, (2) the universe of such
means plus function(s) is well-known in the art, and (3) the universe is
not known to be under development in the art, means plus function
clauses or steps specify a well-known function having well-known
means to accomplish that function or they should be discouraged or
prohibited. A reference to a means for sorting or a means for multiply-
ing matrices is acceptable, i.e., a reference to a matrix multiplication
subroutine with an example referenced is proper. A reference to means
for simulating artificial intelligence is not acceptable.
Any machine claim must be analyzed in terms of method steps, and
the only allowable elements of the machine claim to a computer imple-
mented invention which pertain to an algorithm should be "means of
[method step of allowable method claim]." Alternatively, "a machine
using the [allowable] method of claim [number]" may be permitted.
As a corollary, any future invention that utilizes a new "means for
function" that did not exist at the time of the issuance of the patent on
the present invention will fall outside the claim.
Equivalents must be narrowly construed for patents and claims for
computational methods. The recent case of Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.,94 interprets the so-called "function-way-
result" test established in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co.,9" to include "insubstantial differences." Under this
test, the use of a given computational method for a different function
will always be non-equivalent; only the use of a substantially similar
transforming computational method of a similar set of input for a sub-
stantially similar output and function will be an equivalent
computational method.
(j) The tests for utility, novelty, and non-obviousness must be met
under sections 102 and 103.96 Traditional principles are generally useful
94. 62 F.3d 1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that independent develop-
ment is probative of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 1014 (1996).
95. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
96. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1988).
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except to the extent they need to be modified to comport with these
standards. Embedding a known method in software is not novel. The
preceding discussion on equivalents is useful in examining for novelty
as against prior art. Using a known method in a novel way will often not
be patentable, though also not be infringing a prior patent disclosing
such known method.
(k) There must be a demonstrable actual reduction to practice. The
best mode of any means plus function clause must be known in the art
or must be submitted on a paper copy or a disk submitted to the PTO,
and the best mode of any other aspect of the invention must be submit-
ted on a paper copy or disk submitted to the PTO or a particular module
of a software program or algorithm disclosed, cited, and known in the
art. This means a demonstrably operable copy. The importance of this
test is that "the People" are only willing to award the monopoly if the
inventor discloses the invention in a useful way and the disclosure en-
ables the invention to be used for scientific research and
experimentation so that the next disclosure may be had.
V. WILL THIS TEST SOLVE THE CONCERNS OF
THE ALAPPAT DISSENTERS?
The test set forth above should define the "not patentable" and the
"patentable" portion of the spectrum definitively and substantially nar-
row the gray area in between. The PTO and courts are putting their feet
in what could be dangerous waters, and a cautious approach is proper,
given the enormous and universal usefulness of some algorithms. Ful-
filling the above test will not be easy, and patents will be limited (as
they should be) if no substantial post-solution activity or physical trans-
formation is involved.
Before reviewing the In re Alappat dissent, the reader is reminded
that the majority of the Federal Circuit deciding In re Alappat en banc,
characterized the invention as relating "generally to a means for creat-
ing a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope."97 Based on the
statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 112 6, the Federal Circuit held that
means plus function elements had sufficient physical structure inherent
in an electronic machine to be patentable. The key quotation was:
Although many, or arguably even all, of the means elements re-
cited in claim 15 represent circuitry elements that perform
mathematical calculations, which is essentially true of all digital
97. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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electrical circuits, the claimed invention as a whole is directed
to a combination of interrelated elements which combine to
form a machine for converting discrete waveform data samples
into anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed
on a display means. This is not a disembodied mathematical
concept which may be characterized as an "abstract idea," but
rather a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tan-
gible result.98
This author believes that the inherent association of software with a
machine will not be a useful analytical tool. While the inventor in In re
Alappat should receive a patent, it should be because the method is pat-
entable or the machine using a patentable method is patentable. The
invention should not be patentable simply because the algorithm/
formula/method is embodied in means plus function elements.
A. The Test for Pure Computational Methods and
the In re Alappat Dissent
The lengthy dissenting opinion written by Chief Judge Archer in In
re Alappat (hereinafter the In re Alappat dissent) is a useful anvil on
which to forge and to test the standard in this article.
The In re Alappat dissenters had a series of major complaints about
software patents and algorithm patents generally and characterized the
Alappat patent as having
arranged known circuit elements to accomplish nothing other
than the solving of a particular mathematical equation repre-
sented in the mind of the reader of his patent application.
Losing sight of the forest for the structure of the trees, the ma-
jority today holds that any claim reciting a precise arrangement
of structure satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 101. 99
The first concern expressed was the danger that
[t]hrough the expedient of putting his [a composer's] music on
known structure, can a composer now claim as his invention the
structure of a compact disc or player piano roll containing the
melody he discovered and obtain a patent therefor? The answer
must be no. The composer admittedly has invented or discov-
ered nothing but music. The discovery of music does not
98. Id. at 1544 (footnotes omitted).
99. Id. at 1552 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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become patentable subject matter simply because there is an ar-
bitrary claim to some structure."
Judge Archer rightly complains that "the arbitrary claim to some
structure" is not a helpful distinction. I will return to his accurate criti-
cism of the artificial nature of structure below.
When applying the above test, however, Judge Archer's concern
about music being incorporated into structure is belied by the eloquent
passage (quoted by him in the In re Alappat dissent) of George Curtis,
making general observations about patent law in 1873: "The patent law
relates to a great and comprehensive class of discoveries and inventions
of some new and useful effect or result in matter, not referable to the
department of the fine arts .. .. "'
The standard set forth in this article adopts the understanding of the
courts, patent bar, and Curtis's suggestion of a century ago that the word
"useful" in the patent context means excluding the fine arts, e.g., music
on a compact disc is no different than music on a phonograph record.
Both a compact disc and phonograph record are patentable-the music
is not. Thus, the first concern of the In re Alappat dissent is resolved by
using the traditional definition of "useful" as excluding the fine arts.
In the course of expressing this concern over music, the In re Alap-
pat minority made the following observation: "If Einstein could have
obtained a patent for his discovery that the energy of an object at rest
equals its mass times the speed of light squared, how would his discov-
ery be meaningfully judged for non-obviousness, the sine qua non of
patentable invention? [citation omitted]."' 2
The answer to that question is easy. E=mc2 was non-obvious be-
cause newly-pronounced natural laws are almost always by definition
non-obvious. The answer is so easy that the non-obviousness does not
aid the analysis. Absent constituting pure algebraic manipulation, virtu-
ally any new natural law to be encoded in a software patent will be non-
obvious.
More important is the second question posed by the In re Alappat
dissent: "[w]hen is the abstract idea 'reduced to practice' as opposed to
being 'conceived?"" 03 This is fortunately an easy answer in the context
of software. An abstract idea is reduced to practice when a program is
written or the programming modules or subroutines are designated and
the best mode of invention is disclosed. That is the reason for the final
100. Id. at 1554.
101. Id. at 1551 (quoting G. CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USE-
FUL INVENTIONS xxiii-xxv (4th ed. 1873)).
102. Id. at 1553.
103. Id.
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requirement in the test above; there must be a depository copy or stated
writing in the disclosure of best mode of the software.'14 Absent such a
requirement, Judge Archer's critique correctly observes that the public
will not know if an actual working reduction to practice has occurred.
For algorithms, the idea that the patent application is a constructive re-
duction to practice is not satisfactory, not any more than it would be for
biological material. Without such demonstrable reduction to practice, no
patent should be granted because of the algorithmic nature of software.
Returning to the issue of structure, the In re Alappat dissent ob-
served, "Applicants sometimes attempt to claim digital-electronic
related subject matter by reference to the mathematical function per-
formed by the digital electronic structure."' ' The In re Alappat dissent
then reached back to Gottschalk v. Benson,', observing that "the Su-
preme Court held that claims to a method of converting binary-coded
decimal numbers into pure decimal numbers did not recite an invention
or discovery within § 101, and thus were ineligible for patent protec-
tion."' ' Based on this statement, the In re Alappat dissent argued that
inventions that are substantially mathematical manipulation should not
be patentable.
As stated previously, the author submits that the Benson case has to
be viewed on its facts. Two of the Benson Court's criticisms were that
(a) the "mathematical formula that had no substantial practical applica-
tion except in connection with a digital computer ... [and (b)] the
patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."' 3 This test evades the
first observation by incorporating the concept of transformation of input
to technologically useful output to eliminate incorporation of formulae
for formulae's sake into software. Second, by imposing a requirement
that the method incorporated into the software improve an old method
or be a new short-cut, the preemption-of-field issue and "patent-on-
formula" issue is eliminated. The narrowness of the author's test ad-
dresses Judge Archer's criticism and should eliminate patents being
allowed simply because they have a formula embodied on a machine.
104. The issue is less clear if the deposit is handled like a biological material deposit,
i.e., stored by the inventor or his designee, stored like a printed copy of the patent at the
PTO, or handled like a deposit of biological material. Assuming copies can be obtained at
cost, there is an attraction to off-site storage by the inventor who could monitor copies pro-
duced, protect the inventor's and/or author's copyright, and control the "fair use."
105. 33 F.3d at 1554 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
107. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1555 (Archer, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
108. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
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The In re Alappat dissenters' and the Benson Court's argument that
patents should not be allowed because the invention was useful in con-
nection with only one type of device (a computer) is not constructive,
and it ignores the line of cases allowing inventions that are useful in
connection with only one device. Such a requirement that an invention
be useful on more than one type of device would disqualify a whole
range of inventions, including phonograph records, which no one seems
to seriously argue are unpatentable.
Judge Archer summarizes his analysis of the conclusions of Benson,
Flook, and Diehr as follows:
Under [these cases] the posing and solution of a mathematical
Flook function is non-statutory subject matter. It is non-
statutory even if the particular mathematics is limited to per-
formance in digital electronic circuitry or a general purpose
digital computer, even if the mathematical operations are al-
leged generally to have some application in one or various
technologies, and even if the solution of the function is said
generally to "represent" something of physical or technologic
relevance. On the other hand, an invention or discovery of a
process or product in which a mathematical operation is practi-
cally applied may be statutory subject matter. The fact that one
element of the claimed process or product is a programmed
digital computer or digital electronics performing a mathemati-
cal function does not necessarily preclude patent protection for
the process or product. In this way, the door remains open to the
advancement of technologies by the incorporation of digital
electronics. But the mere association of digital electronics or a
general purpose digital computer with a newly discovered
mathematical operation does not per se bring that mathematical
operation within the patent law."°
The distinction between an invention of a computer containing
software and a programmed digital computer being one of several ele-
ments in a process seems intellectually unsatisfactory. At the same time,
Judge Archer's dissent usefully references that "an invention or discov-
ery of a process or product in which a mathematical operation is
practically applied may be statutory subject matter.....
109. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1557 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
110. Id. at 1557 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Starting from the Morton case"' and applying the focus of this latter
phrase from Judge Archer's opinion, the author's test in this article re-
quires that the method not be a fundamental law, that it be a series of
steps that is functional, and that it be limited in its claims to its function
(i.e., to transforming data for a stated practical application). Thus, the
steps of a particular method claim allowed under this standard, when
used for a different non-equivalent function, for a different non-
equivalent application, or for a different input set to generate an output
for a different purpose, will fall outside the applicant's claim. This
leaves the door open for a new invention for another practical applica-
tion. However, in order to obtain a patent on a new invention outside the
existing patent, it will have to be non-obvious.
Next addressed by the Alappat dissent is the necessity of determin-
ing what was discovered. What was discovered was, according to the
majority, "a means for creating a smooth waveform display in a digital
oscilloscope."
' 2
Claim 15, cited by the Alappat minority, read as follows:
15. A rasterizer for converting vector list data representing
sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased
pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display
means comprising:
(a) means for determining the vertical distance between the
endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels
that is spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and eleva-
tion; and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a
predetermined function of the normalized vertical distance
and elevation. "'
The initial Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences panel, on ap-
peal from the examiner's rejection, found that "'[e]ach clause of the
body of [Alappat's] claim 15 recites a mathematical operation and they
are recited to operate together to reach a numeric value or pure number
111. Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No.
9865).
112. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1557-58 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
113. Id. at 1558 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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as the end product of the claim.'. 14 The reconsideration panel
"reasoned that the means for function clauses must be interpreted as
covering every structure for performing the recited function, and the
burden was on the applicant to prove otherwise..1 5 This is consistent
with PTO practice and In re Donaldson Co.1 6 Both of these observa-
tions appear to the author to be accurate, and within those observations
are several keys to the test set forth in this article dealing with both nov-
elty and the restriction on means for function clauses." 7 The Alappat
majority went to some length to use the Donaldson grasp of equivalents
to hold that the "means for function" clauses included physical structure
and made the claim allowable.
The proposition that the means for function clauses inherently in-
clude physical structure per se is simply overbroad. The next inventor
who has a different formula or algorithm that accomplishes the same
function should not fall within the means for function clause. That is not
the public's intent and it overgrants the monopoly in the area of pure
computational methods. As the reconsideration board in Alappat did
correctly observe, "the claim was to every structure for performing the
recited mathematical functions, and the claim was to be analyzed as
though it actually was directed to a method comprising the functions
performed by the claimed means.""'
The test in this article desires to prevent the pure computational
method being disguised as a machine claim and to prevent the machine
claim from being analyzed differently than a method claim would be
analyzed."9 In part, this is to assist in classification and analysis of prior
art.
Thus, the test in this article would analyze subparts (a)-(d) of Alap-
pat claim 15 by rewriting them as a method claim and then applying the
test:
114. Id. at 1559 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 1560 (Archer, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Ex
parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340, 1342 (BPAI 1992).
116. 16 F.3d 1189, 1193-95 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the Patent & Trademark Of-
fice must apply the means-for-function test to all such claims language); see MPEP, supra
note 11, §§ 2106.02, 2181, 2186.
117. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1540-41
(ruling that a computer operating on software is patentable).
118. InreAlappat, 33 F.3dat 1560.
119. See id. at 1568.
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ALAPPAT CLAIM
(a) means for determining the vertical distance between the
endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels that
is spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation;
and means for outputting illumination intensity data as a
predetermined function of the normalized vertical distance
and elevation.
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a prede-
termined function of the normalized vertical distance and
elevation.
PROPER METHOD CLAIM
(a) determining the vertical distance between the endpoints of
each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) determining the elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned
by the vector;
(c) normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined
function of the normalized vertical distance and elevation so
that... [to be discussed momentarily]
The claim is and should be first analyzed as a method claim only.
The inventor should have been entitled to a patent for what he invented,
which was not an oscilloscope or any device, but a good and useful
computational method using certain input that had a specific result in
connection with an oscilloscope.
The other concern that the standard in this article deals with con-
cerns the preamble. The Alappat majority holds that the word
"rasterizer" in the preamble is not a mere "field-of-use limitation" but
limits claimed subject matter to the production of "output illumination
data.'"1 2 Preambles of claims are not always interpreted to be a narrow
limitation on the claim. What the test in this article proposes is not a
mere "field-of-use" limitation; the test in this article requires that the
120. Id. at 1544.
A New Test for Software Patentability
limitation the majority inferred in the Alappat preamble be a limitation
actually stated in the claim. The contrast is as follows:
ALAPPAT CLAIM
A rasterizer for converting vector list data representing sample
magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination
intensity data to be displayed on a display means comprising:
(a) means for determining the vertical distance between the
endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) means for determining the elevation of a row of pixels that
is spanned by the vector;
(c) means for normalizing the vertical distance and elevation;
and
(d) means for outputting illumination intensity data as a prede-
termined function of the normalized vertical distance and
elevation.
PROPER METHOD CLAIM UNDER PROPOSED TEST
A method for creating a smooth waveform display in a digital os-
cilloscope comprising:
(a) determining the vertical distance between the endpoints of
each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) determining the elevation of a row of pixels that is spanned
by the vector;
(c) normalizing the vertical distance and elevation; and
(d) outputting illumination intensity data as a predetermined
function of the normalized vertical distance and elevation in
order to convert vector list data representing sample mag-
nitudes of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel
illumination intensity data to be displayed in smooth wave-
form on a display means in an oscilloscope. [alternatively:
so that vector list data representing sample magnitudes of
an input waveform are converted into anti-aliased pixel il-
lumination intensity data to be displayed in smooth
waveform on a display means in an oscilloscope.]
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This form and claim makes the method patentable, so the inventor
obtains the monopoly desired. The patent claims are limited to and by
their functionality in transforming certain input. At the same time, any
person who desires to use (a) a first ALU [arithmetic logic unit]; (b) a
second ALU; (c) two barrel shifters; and (d) a ROM [read-only-
memory] and use the same calculation methodology in another function
for a different application will be free to do so. The public will have the
benefit of the disclosure, but the hurdle to future use, and the hurdle of
inventing around the Alappat patent will not be raised too high, which
would be against the public interest.
The Alappat patent, as it was allowed, is attractive in a policy sense
because its disclosure allows others to study it for scientific, experi-
mentation, and research purposes and to design around it. This comports
with the goals of the patent system, even if the patent bar is tempered in
its enthusiasm for those goals. Though not referenced by the dissent,
surely the fact that there was a detailed disclosure must have comforted
the majority.
The dissent also criticizes the majority observation that "if the
claimed 'rasterizer' were equivalent to a 'general purpose digital com-
puter' programmed to perform the calculations performed by the
rasterizer, such programmed computer would be the invention of a 'new
machine' within § 101....2
This latter statement illustrates that the Alappat majority's
"structure analysis" tends to be unproductive. Reprogramming a com-
puter in a useful way is no person's common understanding of a new
machine. Machine claims do not make much sense where pure compu-
tational methods are involved, and there is no other physical structure
outside the computational machine using the algorithm. The rule in In re
Maucorps'2 that claimed apparatus was non-statutory even though it
referred to a disclosed dedicated hard-wired circuit appears correct in
the software patent context;23 a hard wired system that is non-
programmable can just as well capture a formula and such a system
should not be patentable, however narrow the patent may seem to be.
Judge Archer's observation about a newly programmed player piano not
being a new machine is a particularly appropriate analogy to why an
algorithm is only a series of steps, only a method.
121. Id. at 1561.
122. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
123. Id. at 485.
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B. A Digression to a Criticism Not Raised in In re Alappat: Separating
Out Business Methods from Algorithm Patents
One criticism that the Alappat majority did not raise to claims of a
pure computational method was the "business method" problem. Meth-
ods of doing business should not be patentable, whether obvious or
disguised in the claims. In the context of software, this is not a distinc-
tion that is any easier to make than in a non-software context. However,
as an example, a new software program for predicting the weather that
will use a set of inputs and transform and manipulate those inputs into
output is very technologically useful. Yet, there is no physical transfor-
mation involved. We still cannot change the weather. Contrast this
weather prediction method with the method of optimizing bids ad-
dressed in In re Schrader.'24 Taken as a whole, the latter method seems
like a method of doing business, which is and should continue to be
non-patentable. Judge Newman's characterization in the Schrader dis-
sent of a "technologically useful result" is a helpful test to separate out
business methods from patentable computational methods.'25 In
Schrader, Judge Newman concludes that "historical distinctions be-
tween a method of 'doing' business and the means of carrying it out
blur in the complexity of modem business systems."'26 This seems an
overstatement. Judge Newman, while criticizing the business method
exception to patentability, stated that "a system for transacting business,
separate from the means for carrying out the system, is not patentable
subject matter .... "'
Rearranging data or performing an analysis should be a requirement
to a patent. Demanding that the result of that effort-the practical, tech-
nologically useful application-be stated as a limit to the claimed
algorithm should render the fuzzy concept of doing business on the
spectrum of patentability to a narrow range. For example, as in
Schrader, transforming data to guide a robot, or to produce a data table
useful in a technical application, seems much different than claiming a
function producing an optimal bid scheme. The difference is a focus in
the claim on the manipulation of specified input (in the "transforming"
language of the claim) for a specified purpose. Thus, by requiring that
the claim form be written using present participles of "action verbs," or
124. See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting the inventor's
patent application for a method of competitively bidding on a group of related items such as
contiguous tracts of land).
125. Id. at 297 (Newman, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 298 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327
(C.C.P.A. 1942).
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of transitive verbs in present participle form, what data are manipulated
becomes very important. Most modem thinking would regard computer
science, despite its major applications to business, as a technological
field. Patent law should be able to maintain the focus on transformation.
In In re Schrader, the claim was made to "a method for competitively
bidding on a plurality of related items."' This claim was a business
method by its very wording.'29 Further, the inventor in In re Schrader
did not specify steps of transformation of data. One step was "offering
said plurality of items to a plurality of potential bidders."'"3 The trans-
forming language needs to be focused on manipulation of data of
specified input. The word "offering" is not a transforming verb or a verb
of movement. Contrast this with the word "shifting," implying a move-
ment of numbers or data. Note also that "shifting" can be a non-
mathematical step.
Under the test in this article, Schrader could have obtained a patent
for a method of selecting an optimal number, comprising the steps of (1)
entering a series of bids into a data record, (2) indexing each of said
bids, and (3) applying a specified algorithm to maximize the sum of
bids selected from said data record in order to select the highest combi-
nation of bids maximizing revenue to the seller of property.
What Schrader wanted to patent was the idea of the overall system
of "[a] completion identifying a bid for all of said items at a prevailing
total price" without giving the details.'31 Schrader did not specify the
algorithm for which the public should be willing to grant a patent and
rightly was denied a patent.
C. A Return to In re Alappat's Criticisms-Examination Difficulties
Another criticism that Alappat did not raise, which the Supreme
Court cited in Gottschalk v. Benson, 32 was the inability to examine
software patents because of a lack of a classification technique and the
proliferation of prior art. This seems unpersuasive. If claims are con-
fined to transformation directed to a function, classification can be dealt
with in terms of function. While there will be many new functions, the
proliferation of classes and subclasses occurs in most art fields. The
proliferation of prior art will restrict inventions to the required non-
128. Schrader, 22 F.3d at 291 (rejecting the inventor's patent application for a method
of competitively bidding on a group of related items such as contiguous tracts of land).
129. Id. at 291-92.
130. Id. at 292.
131. Id. at 291-92 (rejecting the inventor's patent application for a method of competi-
tively bidding on a group of related items such as contiguous tracts of land).
132. 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972)
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obvious improvements. Art will have to be that which is known to the
reasonably skilled practitioner in the art, which will lead to no more or
less factually intensive inquiries than presently exist.'
D. The Test to Patents in Recent Cases
If the test set out in this article were applied to some of the patents
in the leading cases, many of them would fail. Flook's invention, which
incorporated data from a known method of processing hydrocarbons
into a computer triggered alarm system, should have failed for lack of
novelty or for obviousness. Assuming the method of transforming data
was novel, Diehr's patent to use a computer to translate inputs into a
computer-implemented trigger for an injection machine in a rubber
curing process should be patentable based on the fact that data was
transformed to open a machine and produce rubber. Maucorps' patent
should fail as a business method. The patent claimed in Gottschalk v.
Benson'3 also should probably have failed. It is not clear that there was
any other way of doing what was claimed; i.e., it was a basic formula,
and there was no functional limitation. Furthermore, the formula did not
appear to have been non-obvious over existing hand-calculated formu-
lae. The claims in In re Grams35 to "[a] method of diagnosing an
abnormal condition' 36 that is "applicable to any complex system'
13 7
should have failed for insufficient limitation to a particular function. 31
Similarly, Trovato's claims, which were meant to cover a method
for solving the "critical path problem," should be rejected because they
claimed an algorithm without narrowing their patent to a technologi-
cally useful application.139 In doing so, the algorithm would then be
available for the public to use for other transforming functions to tech-
nologically useful ends. Trovato's claims are a good illustration of
semantics gone awry as inventors attempt to disguise their overbroad
algorithm. For example, the first claim in Trovato's application refers to
133. For example, in the field of electrogalvanic cells, when the Leclanch6 cell was in-
vented (with similar chemistry to your basic present-day flashlight battery), one could hardly
have predicted the proliferation of types of electrogalvanic cells, foreign and domestic, pat-
ented and unpatented, that would exist within 100 years, much less the new crop in the last
twenty years.
134. 409 U.S. 63 (1972)
135. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
136. Id. at 836.
137. Id. at 840.
138. See Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4, § 6.03.
139. In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1994), vacated, 60 F.3d 807 (1995).
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a data structure and describes it as "[a] method for determining motion
of an object... ,,14
Those in favor of patenting software may criticize the test in this
article as too limiting on the scope of protection, but that is the purpose
of the test. Patenting algorithms presents a high risk of granting an
overbroad monopoly. A patent on a fuzzy logic, expert system, or artifi-
cial intelligence program to play chess (i.e., translating an input of a
chess game at a certain move into an optimal output of the next move)
seems eminently desirable because it would leave the rest of the world
free to enjoy the benefits of the software and to learn valuable lessons
from it. The inventor, however, would have to disclaim a series of basic
formulae for eliminating certain fields of non-optimal chess moves.
This may eviscerate portions of what the inventor would like to see
protected, but this demonstrates the point of the test. If a proposed soft-
ware patent is too basic, it should not be patentable for the policy
reasons articulated above.
VI. CLAIMS TO PROGRAMMED APPARATUS
Initially, the author felt only method claims to pure computational
methods should be allowed. However, in light of the majority's opinion
in Alappat and in consideration of the policy goal of gaining disclosure
through a patent monopoly, the author believes a limited machine claim
is allowable without overgranting a patent monopoly."'
The form should be similar to that which was not allowed in the
initial appeal in In re Beauregard:42 "An article of manufacture com-
prising a general purpose computer using the method [executing the
method] of Claim X.',143 Alternatively, a machine with elements ex-
pressed as "means of [allowable method step of an allowable method
claim] would be patentable."'"
140. Id. at 1377. Perverse as it may seem, had Trovato then followed the format of this
article, Trovato may have obtained a patent, but not for the field of art which she desired,
thus giving the public the disclosure without any practical diminution of the public domain.
141. Not with any enthusiasm, however, because software is always a series of steps;
any other characterization or analysis of the invention and claim supposes a false predicate
which will surely end in incomprehensible knots of holdings in cases. See generally Newell,
supra note 83. Patenting the method as a machine can only be for the suspicious purpose in
this context of overextending the patent monopoly beyond what should be patentable-the
mere method.
142. In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
143. See Patenting MathematicalAlgorithms, supra note 4, § 6.03(d).
144. Id.
A New Test for Softvare Patentability
The purpose of the suggested form is to focus the patent and its
equivalents on what should be focused on: the public is prepared to
grant a focused patent right using an algorithm for a specific purpose in
a computer if it is a patentable method and if the means plus function
steps correspond to a patentable method.
First, the courts should be particularly careful to analyze an allow-
able method claim and then determine if the machine-using-method
claim follows the steps of the allowable method claim. Any expansion
of the pure computational method claim should not be allowed in the
context of a machine claim, and, in particular, method claims disguised
as machine claims should be considered especially dangerous. Second,
in order not to stifle large areas of technology by accidentally granting a
patent monopoly over a formula, rarely should an equivalent of a ma-
chine-by-method invention be inferred (just as equivalents of the pure
computational method claim should be only recognized on a limited
basis, as discussed earlier).45 With respect to any new means plus func-
tion element, any new invention that accomplishes the means plus
function in a novel way should automatically fall outside the claim of
the prior pure computational method patent. This concept is necessary
to prevent a means plus function element of a pure computational
method from entirely preempting a different pure computational method
invention with a new and different way of accomplishing the means plus
function. With these careful strictures, a pure computational method
machine claim should be sufficiently narrow to protect the public while
still encouraging disclosure.
VII. CLAIMS TO DATA STRUCTURES
The placement or storage of data in a data structure should be gov-
erned by the standard discussed above for pure computational methods
embedded in software programs. The actual data should be governed by
the copyright laws. This discussion is focused on claims to methods that
are pure algorithms for the arrangement of data.
A data structure is an implementation of an organizational structure
imposed on a set of data capable of being stored in an electronic me-
dium. A straightforward example of a data structure is a typical
university student information processing record structure. Each student
will have information in a field in this nested data structure. Its utilitar-
ian characteristic is that it allows us to generically refer to subsets of
records. An example of a data structure follows:
145. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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For instance, if I choose to sort the variable "PROFESSOR" with a
precursor designating which "PROFESSOR" field I am addressing, the
contents of each record in the field called "PROFESSOR" will be
sorted. Alternatively, I could sort only the "PROFESSOR's for
"COURSE (1)." I can also search for a particular name anywhere in the
data structure as one would often desire, without referring to the generic
label. Alternatively, I may search in a particular field of the data struc-
ture for a particular name and can specify one or more levels in which to
search.
The largest use of computers is not for word processing nor for
mathematical processing (in the sense of applying a formula to a set of
numbers and performing a calculation for some purpose). The largest
use of computers is for storing and processing information. Storing in-
volves placing data in a location where it can be retrieved and
processing involves manipulating a set of data according to a formula.
The above data structure at first looks like a matrix, but, in fact, it is a
complex, multi-dimensional linked matrix set. In the proposed PTO
Guidelines and in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2106, it
is proposed to classify as non-statutory any novel arrangement that is "a
compilation or arrangement of data, independent of any physical ele-
ment.""" This formulation is too narrow and extinguishes a huge area of
information technology dealing with how to efficiently store informa-
146. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,779; MPEP, supra note 11, § 2106. See
also Amended Guidelines, supra note 12, at WV.B.I.b.
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tion in computer memory and, after processing it, how to store it effi-
ciently for access by laypersons. Neither the contents of the data nor the
business method of how the data is arranged in a particular order should
be patentable. However, the method of how data gets stored in a par-
ticular order so that it can be manipulated more easily should be
patentable, provided the method of storage meets the test described in
this article. In addition, if the method of storage is claimed and an algo-
rithm of transformation is claimed given that method and array of
storage, then the algorithm of transformation should be patentable if it
meets the standard for pure computational methods.
The author submits that the recent In re Lowry'47 holding (allowing a
patent to a data structure) is on the right track and seems to meet the
standard of this article. The In re Warmerdam'" invention of a bubble
hierarchy for collision avoidance appears to meet the test in this article
if the application and claim is limited to what the opinion stated was
"controlling the motion of ... robotic machines.', 149 Similarly, in In re
Trovato, if the claim is for a novel method of storage directed to per-
mitting a critical path to be found among the data and is limited to a
particular use of the data and a particular type of input, a patent should
be allowable. 50 By contrast, In re Schrader presents a claim to an algo-
rithm but recites no technologically useful application, merely a system
or method of bidding.'' Had Schrader presented a claim including his
method for transforming a set of inputs to a certain output for a speci-
fied purpose, he might well deserve a patent. However, the protection
and right of exclusion he sought was much broader and rightly disal-
lowed.
A method of arrangement does not fail on the problem of pure for-
mula. Arranging inherently requires a formula to direct where data will
go. However, the arranging function, unlike a formula, is not to trans-
form the data or input itself but to leave a footprint to be electronically
reread. Thus, method claims should be allowable as non-formulaic
(assuming compliance with the test in this article) if the claim is limited
to the objective of arranging data input for rereading according to the
following claim model:
147. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that claims were not analogous to printed
matter, were not obvious, and were not anticipated by prior art).
148. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed Cir. 1994) (finding five claims void of
statutory subject matter and one claim sufficient to pass the definiteness test).
149. Id. at 1355.
150. In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
151. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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A method for arranging data in a memory storage device, the
method comprising:
arranging data in said memory storage device according to
step 1;
arranging data in said memory storage device according to
step 2 [perhaps by a certain formula];
and finally arranging data in said memory storage device
according to step 3,
so that [recite particular utility or function accomplished by
such arrangement in the memory storage device].
The first clause restricts the claim's scope to a memory storage de-
vice, as does the requirement that the arranging of data occur in a
memory storage device. The "so that" clause is intended to recite the
function accomplished and to narrow the claim. The arranging could
occur in conjunction with the device so long as the data ends up in the
device and so long as the "so that" clause narrows the scope of the claim
to the function accomplished in the memory storage device.
VIII. CLAIMS TO PROGRAM STORAGE DEVICES
Program storage devices are analogous to data structures, but they
may raise special problems because program storage device patents
usually are claimed in connection with physical structure. One might
assume that the physical structure in conjunction with a method should
be patentable, yet the form of a claim to a program storage device is an
easy disguise for a claim to a pure formula for acting on data.
In our world of discussing how big our hard disks should be and
how much RAM we need, program storage devices (including hard in-
ternal disks, floppy transportable diskettes, and compact discs) are in
our everyday vocabulary. Conceptually, we should want to allow inven-
tions that store computer readable code or data in novel ways or use a
novel design on a physical structure. New inventions in the area of pro-
gram storage devices are much like a new form of phonograph records.
Although they have at least some physical structure involved, the magic
or the novelty to a layman's eye is that little ones and zeroes can be
placed in them.
Program storage devices are clearly utilitarian. Thus, the proposed
standard of "utility only" for patentability in Patenting Mathematical
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Algorithms5 2 is not a useful standard for the area of program storage
devices because it is too broad.
Program storage devices are frequently referenced in a step in a
method claim, temporarily committing an input to a program storage
device in preparation for a next step that will act on the input so stored.
Because the public does (and should) desire disclosure of novel, useful,
and non-obvious program storage devices, the test of patentability
should focus on novelty and non-obviousness, using traditional patent-
ability analysis. Due to the close association with mathematical
algorithms, the only qualification is that if a claim recites a means for
function, any claims for the device must recite a means for function
which is in a relatively well-understood and well-developed area of
computer technology.
The content of the program storage device in terms of method steps
for transforming input into output must be subject to whatever test for
pure computational methods the courts and the PTO ultimately adopt.
The author of Patenting Mathematical Algorithms characterized claims
55 and 66 of In re Beauregard53 as follows:
55. A program storage device readable by a machine and en-
coding a program of instructions for executing the method steps
of a specified one of claims 1 through 4.
66. An article of manufacture comprising a computer usable
medium having computer readable program code means em-
bodied therein for causing a [general description of function],
the computer readable program code means in said article of
manufacture comprising:
(a) computer readable program code means for causing a com-
puter to effect [description of first specific function];
(b) computer readable program code means for causing the
computer to [description of second specific function 'tied' to
first function] and
(c) computer readable program code means for causing the
computer to [description of third specific function 'tied to first
and/or second function].'"'
152. See Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4, § 6.04.
153. 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the printed matter doctrine did not ap-
ply to computer programs.)
154. See Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4, § 6.03 (citations omitted).
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Accepting the author's characterization of the claims for discussion
purposes, claim 55 is not problematic if claims 1 through 4 meet the test
set forth in this article. Claim 55 is a classic machine-implementing
method claim. The question is whether or not the method is allowable,
and the test for a pure computational method should be applied.
Claim 66 is considerably more dangerous. If elements (a), (b), and
(c) in claim 66 contain algorithms for transforming data instead of algo-
rithms that are restricted to the function of placing data in a program
storage device, the unrestricted function component of these elements
carves out too broad a monopoly. Applying this article's test, the claim
should fail unless: (a) each function is well-known itself; (b) the claim
is limited to its functional purpose (in order to store computer readable
program code in a particular way); and (c) overall, the objective of the
combination of method steps ("the particular way") implicit in the arti-
cle of manufacture claim is novel, utilitarian, and non-obvious and
meets the test in this article. If those tests are not applied, a patent could
be allowed for storing a particular formula or formulae in a program
storage device. A patent to a program storage device is appropriate for
how data is stored in the electronic or physical structure but not for the
storage itself or the use of the formula. To draw an analogy to music on
a compact disc, the way the music is embedded on a compact disc is
patentable; the music itself is not. Also, music per se does not fit within
the phrase "description of function."'55
Accordingly, this author believes the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences should not find the claim in Beauregard per se disallowed
but should render a decision giving guidance, remand the claim(s), and
focus on restricting the claim to what it is and should be: a program
storage device with the necessary and associated algorithm to store data
in a particular way. If the method of storage contemplated in Warmer-
dam is directed to a particular method in connection with a specific
object of the function of such storage, then the claim of a machine hav-
ing a memory with data in a hierarchy generated by this method should
be allowable.
If a formula (which is how we foundered on the danger of software
patents in the first place) cannot be claimed per se but can only be
claimed in conjunction with either a device or a method of storing data,
then the formula and the data itself remain available to the public. Re-
call that the essence of every software program is a series of
mathematical formulae directing a complex circuit to perform in certain
ways. If, as the proposed test above requires, those steps must be di-
155. Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4, § 6.03.
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rected to a function and are further tied to a memory structure, and no
claim is made to the pure formula, then traditional principles of patent
analysis should suffice to protect the public.
IX. CRITIQUE OF THE PATENT OFFICE MPEP GUIDELINES AND THE
PRIOR PROPOSED GuIDELINES FOR
COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED INVENTIONS
A. General Observations
On Friday, June 2, 1995, the PTO published a "Request for Com-
ments on Proposed Examination Guidelines for Computer-Implemented
Inventions" and "Guidelines for Examination of Computer Implemented
Inventions."'56 In the latest revision of the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure published in September 1995, the subjects of computer-
implemented inventions and the necessary disclosure are discussed.' 7
The expressed intent of the proposed Guidelines was:
to assist [Patent] Office personnel in their review of applica-
tions drawn to computer-implemented inventions .... [and to]
respond to recent changes in the law that governs the patent-
ability of computer-implemented inventions, and [to] set forth
the official policy of the Office regarding inventions in this field
of technology,'
The MPEP and the Guidelines appear to restrict software to process
patents only, although this intent is unclear. 9 The most important part
of the publications may be the "Notes on the Guidelines" and the com-
ments in the MPEP."' If the software is claimed without any connection
to, or statement of, the context of a process or machine, the Guidelines
restrict software to the realm of copyright.'6' Such a claim is classified as a
non-statutory process. "The specific word or symbols that constitute a
156. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,778.
157. MPEP, supra note 11, §§ 2106-2106.02. The PTO recently made additional modi-
fications to its examining procedures for computer-related inventions, but these have not yet
been published in the Federal Register. See Amended Guidelines, supra note 12.
158. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,779.
159. See MPEP, supra note 11, § 2100-5; Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at
28,779-81 (referencing computer program-related elements as specific structure corre-
sponding to an element defined in terms of means plus function).
160. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,780; MPEP, supra note 11, §§ 2106-
2106.02; see also Amended Guidelines, supra note 12, at IV.B.1.
161. See Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,780 (stating that words in a pro-
gram are expression but still should be rejected under section 103 for obviousness); MPEP,
supra note 11, § 2106; see also Amended Guidelines, supra note 12, at IV.B.1.
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computer program represent the expression of the computer program
and as such are a literary creation .... A claim in this format should
also be rejected under Section 103, as being obvious over the known
machine-readable storage medium standing alone."''
Pure data structures which do not direct a computer's operation and
"creative or artistic expressions" (e.g., a work of music, art, or litera-
ture) encoded on a "known machine-readable storage medium" are non-
statutory.'63 The restriction that the structure be encoded on a known
medium appears unnecessary and is a source of mischief.
Formulae, per se, are a non-statutory claim under the Guidelines: "A
claim to a method consisting solely of the steps necessary to converting
one set of numbers to another set of numbers without reciting any com-
puter implemented steps would be a non-statutory claim under this
definition."' 6' The MPEP contains similar language which classifies a
process that does nothing more than manipulate abstract ideas or con-
cepts as non-statutory.
Embedding the software in hardware, according to the PTO, does
not necessarily resolve the issue of patentability in the inventor's favor.
In the Guidelines, the next sentence after the previous cited passage
reads: "This [the method of converting numbers] includes the software
and any associated computer hardware that is necessary to perform the
functions directed by the software."' 66 In the MPEP, we are left with a
negative pregnant: "what if the claim to a method consisting solely of
the steps necessary to converting one set of numbers to another"' 67 does
recite a computer implemented step?
The Guidelines do provide that "a claim that is cast as a computer
program but which then recites specific steps to be implemented on or
using a computer should be classified as a process.' 6 8 In that statement,
the Patent Office seemed to imply that it was ready to allow a set of
steps to be patentable. The MPEP Guidelines, however, do not support
such a conclusion. Pure computational methods do not appear to be al-
lowable as is reflected in the prior paragraph.
162. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,780. See also MPEP, supra note 11,
§ 2106; Amended Guidelines, supra note 12, at IV.B.I.a.
163. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,779; see also MPEP, supra note 11,
§ 2106; Amended Guidelines, supra note 11, at IV.B. 1.a.
164. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,780; see also Amended Guidelines, su-
pra note 12, at IV.B.1.a.
165. MPEP, supra note 11, § 2106. Note the unproductive use of the shibboleth
"abstract ideas or concepts" used to disqualify the computer process.
166. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,779.
167. MPEP, supra note 11, § 2106.
168. Proposed Guidelines, supra note 10, at 28,779.
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The required disclosures concentrate on using functional block dia-
grams. They focus on the need to determine a block without undue
experimentation. The MPEP contrasts one case which "found that the
amount of experimentation involved was reasonable where a skilled
programmer was able to write a general computer program, imple-
menting an embodiment form, within 4 hours" with another case which
held that from one and a half to two man years of program development
was "clearly unreasonable."'' 9 Overall, however, the disclosure require-
ment is somewhat amorphous and will likely spawn litigation over the
sufficiency of disclosure. This is because there is no requirement that a
program actually be created or that the blocks be prior art or obvious of
creation. "Bugs" are a major problem in software and computer-
implemented inventions, and working them out of an otherwise obvious
system or block so that the software is basically functional can be a
major project. The danger is that once a patent is granted in the novel
area of software technology, regardless of whether the software inven-
tion works, the patent is a bludgeon to competitors. Given the novelty
and breadth of algorithms, more care in preventing premature patents is
appropriate. This is not meant to exclude inventions featuring relatively
minor problems. An easy example of a recent bug was the incompati-
bility of certain applications which work with the Windows 3 .l1
operating system but do not function with the Windows 95nl operating
system. 7 Obviously the system worked for patent purposes, whatever
its faults for some users. By contrast, the Pentium 171 chip problem
with floating point calculations in 1995, which actually did not function
for certain mathematical processes, was arguably dysfunctional, al-
though query whether any examiner could have discerned the difficulty.
Disclosure is even more important because means plus function
clauses tend to be broad and are freely usable. The PTO and the Alappat
majority were sidetracked onto the means plus function analysis be-
cause of the Supreme Court's reference to structure. The breadth of
means plus function clauses and the intellectual deception of not using
method analysis of computer-implemented inventions will likely cause
some inappropriate fluctuation in analysis to reconcile the overbroad
means plus function clauses with a difficult analysis tool. The means
plus function is one of the best ways to not only obtain claim breadth
169. MPEP, supra note 11, § 2106.02 (citing Hirschfeld v. Banner, 462 F. Supp. 135
(D.D.C. 1978) and White Consol. Indus. v. Vega Servo-Control, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 796
(S.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
170. Windows and Windows 95 are trademarks of Microsoft, Inc.
171. Pentium is a trademark of Intel Corp.
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but also, in a computer-implemented invention context, to make the
least disclosure.
B. Specific Comments and Proposed Revisions to the Guidelines
The author's view is that the MPEP and guidelines appear to resolve
the Beauregard issue and allow patents on program storage devices,
although data structures are not addressed specifically. Programmed
apparatus, which looks like a machine, is clearly allowed, although the
MPEP provides that implementing a non-statutory process on a machine
does not create an allowable invention. However, the MPEP does not
deal with achieving the public's objective of "disclosure in exchange for
a brief monopoly"'72 to allow the patentability of new programs to ma-
nipulate data, nor does it deal with the line between computational
methods and computational methods programmed on a machine, i.e.,
programmed apparatus.
In the MPEP and the Proposed Guidelines, the Patent Office appar-
ently fails to recognize that there are innovative ways to manipulate
numbers for certain purposes. There is no statutory reason nor is there
any policy reason not to allow patents of software for specific purposes.
Moreover, in some instances, the copyright laws permit mask works,
and no public disclosure is achieved. Even if a work is not filed as a
mask work but is filed in observable source code (i.e., machine code) in
the depository copy, it is the steps of thinking embedded in the source
code which the public would like to know. Program documentation-
the explanation of how the program is assembled-allows us to know
how to use the program and allows us to improve it. That revelation will
only be best achieved through the patent laws.
The earlier draft of this article submitted to the PTO as a comment
contained an appendix with suggested changes to the Proposed Guide-
lines. Because the Proposed Guidelines are now final in the MPEP, the
litmus test for software patentability will be in the courts. The concepts
in this article are difficult to fit into the present MPEP format. Realisti-
cally, the Guidelines should be recast and formatted somewhat
differently. As Professor Newell notes, the present model is slightly
broken for purpose of software patents,'73 and the PTO needs to rethink
how it organizes the format of the MPEP and the Guidelines, for com-
puter-implemented inventions.
172. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2,10 n.3 (1966); see also id at nn. 9-10
(discussing Thomas Jefferson's view of patents as a reward of limited protection in exchange
for sharing information).
173. See Newell, supra note 83, at 1034 (concluding that present models for evaluating
patentability of algorithms are insufficient).
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X. CONCLUSION
A. A Vignette in Support of Caution
This article has suggested that the Patent and Trademark Office and
the courts should allow patents on pure computational methods in soft-
ware if appropriate restrictions are embedded by the inventor in the
claims. The public wants to know the innovative means of accomplish-
ing certain objects by certain computer programs so that others will use
that knowledge to find different and better means to build on those pro-
grams for the betterment of society.
This is a controversial subject, to say the least, and in advocating
that a new course be set, it is appropriate that the following observation
be shared. Otherwise, readers may be persuaded the issue can, so to
speak, run before the wind with the spinnaker out.
Without the intent of adding fuel to the fire by impairing DNA pat-
entability, the contrast of the current patentability of DNA sequences
and the lack of patentability of software programs illustrate why this
area is so difficult and why a balance must be struck.
Recent research suggests that DNA has an inherent capability to re-
program itself. The research on artificial intelligence and the function of
sleep suggests that sleep and dreaming during sleep are functions in
which our minds (complex computers) generate random sets of images.
When we wake up, our subconscious views the world around it and at-
tempts to reconcile the random sets of images with the reality of the
world. It may only partially succeed, and, in our next sleep, our subcon-
scious thinks about more random sets of images. However, it is more
closely focused on what we just saw, having discarded the completely
non-conforming images of the night before from consideration.
Computers are now being set to the same function. An object is
shown to the computer which digitizes it. The computer generates a
random set of images in its "sleep" (in the mode of randomizing, if you
will) and then "wakes up," reviewing a reality through input to the com-
puter and eliminates more radical images. It then returns to randomize
on closely analogous images. The computer has been shown to become
"more learned" in the sense of developing a more and more accurate
image of reality.174 Considering how babies begin to talk, such models
sound logical empirical and theoretical.
This suggests that in twenty years, we may have biological blobs
composed of DNA molecules functioning as primitive computers off of
174. See Y.S. Abu-Mostafa, Machines that Learn from Hints, Sci. AMt, Apr. 1995, at 64
(indicating that machine learning is an area of tremendous technological growth).
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microelectronic inputs. This revolutionary research illustrates the dan-
ger of too quickly concluding a technology is patentable, of allowing
too broad a means clause, and of assuming that a formula or method has
only narrow applicability. Perhaps a patent granted in five years on a
DNA molecule will bar the use of that molecule in twenty years in
broader contexts for a different, and as yet unimagined, function. A pat-
ent of a DNA sequence directed to a use or function with that use or
function being stated as a limitation in the claim would remove this
danger.
B. As Software Development Becomes More Industrialized and Less
Academic, the Timing for Patentability of Software Is Right
The recent PTO Guidelines deal with the problem which occasioned
them: the patentability of program storage devices. That is but one of
four paradigms this article discusses. As suggested in Patenting Mathe-
matical Algorithms,175 the four paradigms of current interest are: (a)
claims to pure computational methods, (b) claims to programmed appa-
ratus, (c) claims to data structures, and (d) claims to program storage
devices. The MPEP and the PTO Guidelines should go further in al-
lowing patents on these paradigms but focus on restricting the claims to
particular functions and force better disclosure.
Previously, most research in innovative program algorithms to im-
prove existing problem solutions occurred in an academic setting, where
there is pressure to publish. However, with the profit now to be
achieved in the computer and computer software business, much re-
search and development is privately funded, and the incentive to place
the information and knowledge in the public domain is much less or
even non-existent. Why should a car manufacturer with an innovative
manufacturing solution involving a software algorithm yield any part of
that knowledge to the public if no monopoly can be received? While the
business method of the manufacturing solution should not be patentable,
surely the technology of the software program for that particular manu-
facturing solution ought to be patentable as a new and useful process.
Allowing a patent monopoly for software focused on a particular
function whose functionality is a limitation on the scope of the monop-
oly balances the public desire for disclosure against the inventor's
reward of a limited monopoly. As computer technology unfolds in an
exciting way, the grant of a limited monopoly in return for disclosure
should, as it has in many other fields, spur other inventors onto new dis-
175. Patenting Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 4, § 6.0 (delineating differing
courts' views on the patentability of algorithm-based material).
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closures and new developments without undue stifling of innovation
because of an overbroad monopoly. If the seventeen year monopoly is
the concern, the PTO should recommend to Congress that the term of
patents in computer implemented technology be more limited in time
before the early inventors receive a long term and the later ones arbi-
trarily receive a shortened term.
The framers of the Constitution, could not foresee the modem digi-
tal computer. They likely would not have intended all software
technology simply to be dumped into the classification of abstract ideas,
laws of nature, and natural phenomena 76 to be forever excluded from
the patent area. Therefore, we can surmise that some patentability would
have been allowed. Analyzing the claims as method steps and requiring
functional limitations on software patents reconciles competing patent
policies and interests in this area of technology where the course of fu-
ture development is not as yet well understood.
176. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
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